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INTRODUCTION
When the team of government-funded research scientists
created what was to become known as the Internet in the 1980s,
the world saw it as a brilliant new means of communication that
could survive even a nuclear attack.1 As with the unleashing of
any new technologies, however, progress was destined to create
conflict with current laws. While still in its infancy, the Internet
cast a dark shadow of infringement that turned the formerly stable
institution of copyright upside down.
By 2001, the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (IFPI) estimated that there were at least twenty-five
million illegal music files available on the Internet.2 Record
companies claim that piracy, largely through the growth of peer-topeer services, has caused a massive decline in album shipments.3
In fact, album sales dropped two-and-a-half percent in 2001 and
nine percent in 2002.4 The problem has a much wider scope
outside of America, where the recording industry estimates
physical piracy, typically defined as the public sale of copied CDs
and tapes, already causes lost sales of two to four billion dollars
each year.5 Thus, the availability of digital downloading may be
the biggest threat to copyright that has ever surfaced, and the
advent of new technology, without safeguards, will only make the
situation worse.
In looking for a global solution, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) developed two Internet treaties in late 1996.6
1

But see KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE
STORY BEHIND THE CREATION OF THE INTERNET (1996) (questioning the widely held
notion that the Internet was originally designed to provide the military with a
communication device capable of withstanding a nuclear attack).
2
See EU Ministers Back Internet Copyright, BBC News Online, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1269000/1269514.stm (Apr. 9, 2001).
3
See Lynne Margolis, CD Industry Lacks Formula for Success, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Jan. 2, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0102/p02s01-usgn.html.
4
See id.
5
See Brad King, Can the World Be Copyrighted?, Wired News, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50658,00.html (Feb. 26, 2002).
6
See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty [WCT], Apr.
12, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, available at 1997 WL 447232; WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty [WPPT], Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. No.
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To ratify these treaties, the United States and the European Union
adopted anti-circumvention measures to ensure that technology
does not destroy copyright. These legislative measures became
known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)7 in the
United States and the “Copyright Directive”8 in the European
Union. Despite the creation and signing of agreements on both
sides of the Atlantic, this legislation may not work in practice
when trying to harmonize copyright law and stop the mass
downloading of copyrighted music. For example, the user-friendly
and anonymous nature of the Internet and a recent decision by the
Court of Appeals in Amsterdam9 challenge the agreements’ goals.
Downloading today goes far beyond the much-weakened
Napster. The new programs used for downloading copyrighted
works, including Kazaa, Grokster, Morpheus, and Gnutella, are
thriving and pose new challenges for lawmakers, courts, and
copyright holders. Specifically, many of them allow the trading of
copyrighted DVD files in addition to music, and all of them do not
contain a central server through which files pass.10 In addition, the
evidence that many artists, including platinum-selling ones, have
been using the Internet to market themselves and send music to
fans suggests that the finding of positive uses for online music
distribution through the new decentralized programs will be very
different than it was in Napster II.11 Finally, while Napster was
easy to stop by shutting down its central server,12 the new filesharing programs are self-perpetuating, much like a disease; the
only way to stop them would be to seize every piece of technology
containing the programs.

CRNR/DC/95 [hereinafter WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty], available at
http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/95dc.htm.
7
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA], Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1322 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 4001 (2000)).
8
Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10–19 [hereinafter Copyright
Directive].
9
See infra Part II.B.
10
See infra Part II.C.
11
A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Napster II].
12
See infra Part II.C.
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The purpose of this Note is to examine the international
struggle of protecting copyright in the digital age and analyze legal
efforts in the United States and the European Union. This Note
takes the position that the United States’ and the European Union’s
measures are not appropriate or effective enough to combat
international use of the new decentralized peer-to-peer services for
downloading copyrighted works.
In addition, this Note
emphasizes that the threat of digital copyright infringement is truly
global and requires an international effort to build protection for
authors. Such effort must ensure that the public’s interests are
considered when the international community enacts legislation
affecting the public’s right to make socially important uses of
copyrighted works.
Part I of this Note provides a background of how copyright
functions in the digital age and discusses recent international
attempts to protect copyrights, including the WIPO Internet
treaties. Part II examines how the United States and European
Union plans for implementation of the WIPO Internet treaties
conflict with current legal interpretation, the history of copyright as
applied, and the changing nature of technology. Finally, Part III
sets forth solutions for balancing law and policy goals when trying
to draw the boundaries between infringement and fair use. Given
that it is unlikely that digital infringement will ever cease entirely,
lawmakers should abandon such an impossible goal and instead
focus on designing copyright laws that best “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts,”13 by encouraging creativity,
knowledge, and advancements in digital technology.
I.

HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW

A. Infringement of the Exclusive Rights Under Copyright
The term “copyright” actually refers to a bundle of exclusive
rights retained by the author or owner of the copyright.14 Although
copyright covers a large range of exclusive rights, those that have
13
14

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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been implicated in the Internet music debate are the right of
reproduction, the right of distribution, and the right of public
performance.15 The distribution right guarantees the copyright
owner the right “to distribute copies or phonorecords . . . to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending . . . .”16 Thus, the copyright owner has the right to prohibit
others from distributing the work—a sale is not required if there is
a transfer of a tangible copy to the public—until she parts with
ownership.17 This right, however, is generally limited by the “first
sale doctrine,” which allows the purchaser of the physical object
embodying the copyrighted work to treat the thing as her own.18
For example, a person who buys a book from a store may sell it to
a second-hand bookstore without permission of the author.
Although under the first sale doctrine the new owner may sell the
work or copy to someone else, that does not give her permission to
make copies of the work. Therefore, a person who buys a CD may
give it to her friend or sell it to a used CD store, but this does not
give her permission to make a copy for her own collection and then
give the CD to her friend. In addition, the Copyright Act19 and the
European Union’s “Software Directive”20 each contain an
exception to the first sale doctrine, forbidding the commercial
rental, lease, or lending, or any act “in the nature of rental, lease, or
lending,” of phonorecords and computer programs.21
The right of reproduction allows the copyright owner to
prevent all others from reproducing the work in the form of a copy
or phonorecord.22 There is an exception to this right under both
the Copyright Act and the Copyright Directive for temporary
recordings, but only in the case of broadcast organizations that are
15

See id. § 106(1), (3)–(4). The right of public performance is also known as the “right
of communication to the public” in the WIPO treaties. See WCT, supra note 6.
16
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
17
See id.
18
See id. § 109.
19
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914.
20
Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) [hereinafter Software Directive].
21
17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1). See also Software Directive, supra note 20; Council Directive
92/100/EC, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (harmonizing the EU countries’ first sale doctrines).
22
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). A “copy” is defined as a “material object from which, either
with the naked eye or other senses, or with the aid of a machine or other device, the work
can be perceived, reproduced or communicated.” Id. § 101.
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recording works for later transmission.23 The Copyright Act
requires that the user destroy the permitted copy within a certain
amount of time,24 except for archival purposes.25
The right of performance or communication to the public
allows the copyright owner to prevent all others from publicly
performing the work.26 This right includes a prohibition on
unauthorized broadcasting or “webcasting” without the copyright
holder’s permission.27 In addition to composers, who already had
a right of public performance under the copyright laws, owners of
copyrights to sound recordings28 also received a public
performance right in the United States under the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA).29
Infringement occurs whenever a third party exercises one of
the rights that the copyright holder exclusively retains,30 and the
infringer is liable whether there was intent or not.31 It has also
been established in the United States that a conduit for copyright
infringement may be liable for contributory and vicarious
infringement,32 except in cases that fall under the safe harbor
provision of section 512 of the DMCA.33 No member state in the
European Union has explicitly specified the extent of any vicarious
23

See id. § 111(b)–(c); Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 5(1).
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(b)–(c).
25
See id. § 117(a)(2).
26
See id. § 106(4), (6).
27
See id. § 106(6). Webcasting is generally defined as the transmission of sounds over
the Internet, much like how music is transmitted over the airwaves from radio stations to
radio receivers. See Webcast, SearchNetworking.com, at http://searchnetworking.
techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci213344,00.html (last visited May 10, 2003) (“The
term ‘Webcasting’ is used to describe the ability to use the Web to deliver live or delayed
versions of sound or video broadcasts.”).
28
A sound recording is distinct from the song itself. Generally, if a record company
hires a composer to write a song, the composer retains the right to the underlying
composition, while the record label retains the rights to the recording of the song as
performed by an artist under contract with the label. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 114 (granting
exclusive rights in sound recordings), with id. § 115 (granting exclusive rights in
nondramatic musical works).
29
See id. § 106(6).
30
See id. § 501; WCT, supra note 6.
31
See id. § 501; WCT, supra note 6.
32
See infra Parts I.A, II.A.1.
33
See 17 U.S.C. § 512; infra Part II.A.1.
24
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liability, although the concept is mentioned in the Copyright
Directive.34
The best-known case concerning copyright infringement of
digital music illustrates how courts have applied principles of
copyright to infringement in the digital age. In Napster II,35
several record labels sued Napster and its affiliates for direct,
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement after the
company provided free software (called “MusicShare”) to the
public allowing “peer-to-peer” file sharing over the Internet.36 The
software allowed a user to make exact copies of digital music files
from one computer and transfer them through Napster’s server
onto the user’s own computer.37 To prove direct infringement, the
record companies had to show that Napster violated one of the
exclusive rights reserved to copyright owners.38 The Ninth Circuit
held that Napster users, but not Napster itself, had directly
infringed distribution rights, by uploading file names to the search
index for others to copy, and reproduction rights, by downloading
the copyrighted music files.39
After the court concluded there was direct infringement by the
users, the court then proceeded to the question of whether Napster
was contributorily or vicariously liable.40 The court held that
Napster itself was likely to be found liable for contributory
infringement because it knew or had reason to know of direct
infringement of the record labels’ copyrights.41 In addition, the
court found that Napster “materially contribute[d] to the infringing
activity” because without the software and support it provided, the
users could not download the music they wanted.42 Finally, it held
that Napster was likely to be found liable for vicarious
infringement because it had “the right and ability to supervise the
34

See Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 8.
A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
36
See id. at 1011.
37
See id.
38
See id. at 1013.
39
See id. at 1014.
40
See id. Contributory and vicarious liability have separate elements from direct
liability. See supra Part II.C.2.
41
See id. at 1021.
42
Id. at 1022.
35
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infringing activity” and also had “a direct financial interest in such
activities.”43 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the financial
benefit did not have to be immediate, noting that: “[f]inancial
benefit exists where the availability of infringing material ‘acts as a
draw for customers.’”44
Although the ruling appeared very broad, the Ninth Circuit
tempered it by limiting the scope of liability and placing the
burden on the plaintiffs to protect their works:
[C]ontributory liability may potentially only be imposed to
the extent that Napster: (1) receives reasonable knowledge
of specific infringing files with copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings; (2) knows or should
know that such files are available on the Napster system;
and (3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of the
works.45
The court then required the record labels to “provide notice to
Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works
available on the Napster system before Napster ha[d] the duty to
disable access to the offending content. Napster, however, also
b[ore] the burden of policing the system within the limits of the
system.”46 In the end, the court granted the injunction against
Napster.47
B. International Copyright Protection Before Napster
Global copyright protection’s roots are in the 1886 Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(hereinafter “Berne Convention”).48 The Berne Convention set
minimum standards for copyright protection and included an
allowance for enforcement procedures, although national law could
43

Id.
See id. at 1023.
45
Id. at 1027.
46
Id. These caveats may become loopholes for future peer-to-peer defendants. See
infra Part II.C.2.
47
See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1028.
48
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (amended 1979) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
44
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create greater protection if a signatory state so desired.49 One of
the major goals of the Berne Convention was to “protect, in as
effective and uniform manner as possible, the rights of authors in
their literary and artistic works,” regardless of the nationality of the
author.50 The treaty, however, was not without its faults: it did not
protect owners of sound recordings, nor did it create any global
system of enforcement of copyright laws against infringement.51
Illustrative of the problem with harmonization through
international treaties, the United States did not join the Berne
Convention until 1988, over a century after its enactment.52 In
addition, because enforcement is left to the signatory states, there
is no remedy under the Berne Convention when a state lags in
pursuing those who infringe copyrights.53
Dissatisfied with the protection under the Berne Convention,
the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has approximately
140 members, brought intellectual property into trade regulation
during the 1986–1994 GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.54 The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) attempted to fill the gaps left by other treaties and
apply the Berne Convention standards to the WTO states gradually
from 2000 to 2006.55 Like the Berne Convention, however, TRIPS
is not self-executing, and each state must establish its own means
of enforcement.56
In response to the “profound impact” the Internet was having
on literary and artistic works, and because the Berne Convention

49

See Liz Robinson, Comment, Music on the Internet: An International Copyright
Dilemma, 23 HAWAII L. REV. 183, 190 (2000).
50
See Berne Convention, supra note 48, arts. 5–6.
51
See Linda W. Tai, Music Piracy in the Pacific Rim: Applying a Regional Approach
Towards the Enforcement Problem of International Conventions, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J.
159, 170 (1995).
52
See Robinson, supra note 49, at 190.
53
See id.
54
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 22 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
55
See Robinson, supra note 49, at 197–98.
56
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 54, art. 14(2).
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had not been updated since 1971,57 the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), which has 175 member states, sought a
solution. On December 20, 1996, it adopted the WIPO Copyright
Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty (WPPT).58 The WCT and WPPT expanded previous
standards for copyright to cover digital works.59 They both
specifically address and affirm the exclusive rights of distribution,
reproduction, and communication to the public of authors’,
performers’, and record companies’ works, including the right to
make “works available in a way that the public can access them at
a time and place of [the owners’] own choosing, which is the
typical paradigm of transmissions over the Internet.”60 The WIPO
treaties also specifically require all those who ratify them to
implement regulations and remedies against “the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors
[including performers or producers of phonograms] in connection
with the exercise of their rights” under the WIPO treaties.61
These WIPO Internet treaties set the background and together
are the basis for the United States’ DMCA and the European
Union’s Copyright Directive. For example, the United States,
already having an exclusive right of communication to the public
contained in a myriad of laws, focused on the anti-circumvention
aspect of the treaties when creating the DMCA.62 The European
Union, on the other hand, addressed both the digital rights and
anti-circumvention in its Copyright Directive.63 Perhaps the
57

See Jesse Feder, Symposium: Keynote Address, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 265, 268 (2001).
58
See WCT, supra note 6; WPPT, supra note 6. These treaties are often referred to
collectively as the WIPO “Internet treaties.” See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The
Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the Very Old and the
Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 931 (2002).
59
See WCT, supra note 6, art. 1(4); WPPT, supra note 6, art. 18.
60
Feder, supra note 57, at 268–69.
61
WCT, supra note 6, art. 11 (providing that “Contracting Parties shall provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise
of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect
of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law”).
See also WPPT, supra note 6, art. 18.
62
See Feder, supra note 57, at 269.
63
See id.
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United States and the European Union jumped in too quickly,
however, as neither the WCT nor the WPPT will go into effect
until it is ratified by thirty member states.64 Only about nineteen
member states currently have done so.65
II.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN NEW LEGISLATION AND HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION

A. Implementation of the WIPO Treaties
1. The United States and the DMCA
To comply with the WIPO treaties, the United States passed
the DMCA in 1998.66 In fact, Title I of the DMCA specifically
implements the two WIPO Internet treaties.67 The main focus of
the DMCA is split into two parts: Section 120168 prohibits the
circumvention of copyright protections, and section 51269 provides
a safe harbor for online service and Internet service providers (ISP)
who are accused of contributory or vicarious infringement when
their subscribers infringe copyrights.70 Only the former section
was required by WIPO; the latter was the result of a bargain made
with ISPs to ensure that the measure would pass more easily in
Congress.71
64

See id. at 268.
See id.
66
DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1988) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1322 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000)).
67
17 U.S.C. § 101.
68
Id. § 1201.
69
Id. § 512.
70
See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 99-CV-2070, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1889, at *17–*18 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (“The DMCA prohibits the manufacture,
import, offer to the public, or trafficking in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof that: (1) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively ‘controls access to’ a copyrighted
work or ‘protects a right of a copyright owner;’ (2) has only limited commercially
significant purpose or use other than to [circumvent] such technological protection
measures; or (3) is marketed for use in circumventing such technological protection
measures”).
71
See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 135 (2001); cf. In re Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 37 (D.D.C. Jan. 2003) (“Congress . . . created trade-offs
65
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Section 1201, while initially thought of as an anti-infringement
statute, is actually separate from the Copyright Act’s definition of
copyright infringement.72 It instead focuses on methods created to
circumvent technological protections on copyrighted works.73 In
RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., the defendant was charged
with infringement and violation of the DMCA’s section 1201
because it manufactured programs that would bypass the plaintiff’s
protection measures and access the files on the plaintiff’s server,
allowing the user to make unauthorized copies of digital music
files and convert those files into various formats.74 Without
Streambox’s software, users could not bypass the protected files
and get music on such a grand scale.75 The court held that two of
the programs, the “Streambox VCR” and the “Ferret” violated the
DMCA, but the “Ripper” did not.76 The court found that the
Streambox VCR was designed primarily to circumvent
RealNetworks’ access control and copy protection measures,77 and
that the Ferret created a derivative work by modifying the
plaintiff’s program.78 Thus, they both directly infringed the
copyright.79

within the DMCA: service providers would receive liability protections in exchange for
assisting copyright owners in identifying and dealing with infringers who misuse the
service providers’ systems. At the same time, copyright owners would forgo pursuing
service providers for the copyright infringement of their users, in exchange for the
assistance in identifying and acting against those infringers.”).
72
See RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *17.
73
See id. (“RealNetworks’ claims against the Streambox VCR and the Ripper . . . arise
under section 1201 of the DMCA, and thus do not constitute copyright ‘infringement’
claims.”); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
12.A18[B], at 12A–185 (2002) (noting that section 1201 of the DMCA occupies “a niche
distinct from copyright infringement”).
74
See RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *10–*11.
75
See id. at *19.
76
Id. at *3. The “Streambox VCR” would imitate RealNetworks’s “secret handshake”
so RealNetworks’s program would think the user of the Streambox VCR was authorized
to download and copy files. See id. at *11–*13. This worked much like a cable television
box that would unscramble signals for which the user had not paid. See id. The “Ripper”
allowed a user to convert a file from one format to another. See id. The “Ferret,” when
installed as a “plug-in” to a user’s computer, altered the visual appearance and operation
of RealNetworks’s interface. See id.
77
See id. at *21.
78
See id. at *31.
79
See id.
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Conversely, the court dismissed the claim on the Ripper
because the format that the Ripper converted was not a
preventative “technological measure,” and the Ripper had
“legitimate and commercially significant uses.”80 This illustrates a
form of exclusivity between violations of the DMCA and
copyright infringement. Because the Ripper was not an anticircumvention measure and thus did not violate the DMCA, it went
through a fair use analysis similar to the one in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.81 This analysis was used to determine
whether the creators of the program were liable for contributory or
vicarious infringement, as in Napster II.82 Since RealNetworks
defines steps for the analysis of mixed infringement/anticircumvention claims, it could be instrumental in predicting how
courts will examine such claims in the future.
Before the issues on copyright infringement were addressed in
the Napster II case, Napster first tried to invoke the DMCA’s safe
harbor provision under section 512 to avoid monetary damages and
injunctive relief in Napster I.83 Napster argued that it should be
considered an ISP under Section 512(a), and enjoy limited liability
for copyright infringement resulting from the transmission of files
through its network.84 The court evaluated the five conditions to
be satisfied for such a finding:
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at
the direction of a person other than the service provider; (2)
the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or
storage is carried out through an automatic technical
process without selection of the material by the service
provider; (3) the service provider does not select the
recipients of the material except as an automatic response
to the request of another person; (4) no copy of the material
made by the service provider in the course of such
intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the
80

Id. at *28, *30.
464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also infra Part II.C.
82
239 F.3d 1004, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
83
A&M Records v. Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
[hereinafter Napster I], aff’d 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
84
See id.
81
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system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such
anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably
necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of
connections; and (5) the material is transmitted through the
system or network without modification of its content.85
After analyzing the elements, the court found that Napster was
not a “service provider” as defined by section 512(a) because it did
not “transmit, route, or provide connections for allegedly
infringing material through its system.”86 Most importantly,
Napster did not implement a policy of termination for subscribers
who were repeat infringers under section 512(i).87 The court
explained that Napster had to satisfy this subsection to enjoy any
protection under section 512, but found that it did not comply,
despite its ability to terminate such users. Napster, therefore, could
not invoke the safe harbor provisions at all.88
This would seem a strong victory for the record industry, if
only to completely eliminate accused infringers’ use of the
argument that their status as ISPs exempts them from section 512.
While everyone was watching Napster, however, dozens of clones
sprouted up—ones with better, harder-to-trace systems that had no
central server to attack.89 Most programs in use now are built on
“distributed networks,” through which computers search other
computers’ files, without having to use a central index.90 Because
these networks are distributed, and not centralized, it is nearly
impossible either to shut them down or find the alleged infringers
to sue.91 If found and brought to court, the creators of the
networks would undoubtedly distinguish themselves from Napster
I, arguing that once the software is distributed, its usage can no
longer be controlled and the infringers cannot be removed from the
85

Id. at *9–*10.
Id. at *25.
87
See id. at *29–*30.
88
See id.
89
See Charles C. Mann, The Year the Music Dies, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 92.
90
See Douglas Wolk, Rough Trade, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 26, 2002, at 36. These
decentralized programs include Kazaa, Limewire, Gnutella, Morpheus, and Grokster. Id.
91
See id.
86
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system.92 They could then try to define themselves as ISPs under
section 512 and “do their best” to help the record industry stop
infringement, even though the services’ “best” may amount to
doing nothing.93 Although this argument could be successful on
technical grounds, peer-to-peer services are unlikely to pass the
first hurdle that Napster failed: the requirement for the service to
“transmit, route, or provide connections for allegedly infringing
material through its system.”94 The courts reviewing future cases
involving other programs would likely never get to the secondary
issue of user termination.95
Despite the new programs’ lack of control, the DMCA test
under section 1201, as illustrated in RealNetworks, will probably
not bend an inch for the creators of any programs found to
circumvent copyright security measures.
Nevertheless,
RealNetworks is distinguishable from the case where a program
allows sharing of compressed music files. Whereas RealNetworks
had set up security measures against unauthorized access or
copying, it can be argued that record companies have failed to set
up security measures of their own. Therefore, a file-sharing
program such as Kazaa, which is one of the peer-to-peer programs
built on a distributed network,96 cannot be found to be
circumventing any “technological measure” and would thus not be
liable under section 1201 of the DMCA.97 This finding would
bring the program back under the similar test formulated by the
RealNetworks court for the Ripper to assess the program’s
capability for substantial noninfringing uses.98 As will be
92

See Dutch Court Clears Web Music Swapping, MSN Tech & Gadgets, at
http://msn.com.com/2100-1105-870551.html (Mar. 28, 2002) (explaining a Dutch
appellate court decision overturning a finding of Kazaa’s liability for copyright
infringement, “saying Kazaa is not responsible for the illegal actions of people using its
software”).
93
Napster I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *29–*30; see also infra Part II.C.2
(providing a more in-depth discussion of peer-to-peer program creators’ inability to
monitor infringement).
94
Id. at *29–*30.
95
See id.
96
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
97
See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1889, at *28 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
98
See id.
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discussed in Part II.C., however, courts in general have not
followed the “substantial noninfringing use” test for file-swapping
programs, as the sheer volume of copyright infringements on the
Internet has caused some courts to focus more on making the
problem go away at the expense of the public’s fair use rights.
2. The European Union’s Response
In June of 2001, the European Parliament and the Council
passed the Copyright Directive on the “harmonization of certain
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society.”99 Like the DMCA, the Copyright Directive was intended
to enable the European Union and its member states to ratify the
WCT and WPPT.100 The Copyright Directive was also intended to
bring Europe’s copyright laws up to speed with technological
advances, including Internet file swapping.101 The member states
had until December 22, 2002, to ratify and implement the new
law.102 Only a handful of states, however, have begun the process
and only Greece has actually enacted legislation that follows the
Copyright Directive.103 The states that intend to ratify the law are
still proceeding in their efforts under pressure from the European
Union.104
On the occasion of its enactment, Frits Bolkestein, Internal
Market Commissioner of the European Parliament, emphasized the
Copyright Directive’s importance, stating that “[n]ot only is this
Directive the most important measure ever to be adopted by
Europe in the copyright field but it brings European copyright rules
into the digital age.”105 The Copyright Directive attempts to
prohibit the swapping of copyrighted files and harmonize
99

Copyright Directive, supra note 8.
See id.
101
See id.
102
See Europe Approves Copyright Law, Wired News, at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,42934,00.html (Apr. 9, 2001).
103
See Copyright Directive—Implementation Running Late, STM Copyright News, at
http://www.stm-assoc.org/committees/copynews.html (Jan./Feb. 2003).
104
See id.
105
The European Commission, Commission Welcomes Adoption of the Directive on
Copyright in the Information Society by the Council, Intellectual Property: News, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/intprop/news/copyright.htm (Apr. 9, 2001).
100
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reproduction, distribution, and public communications rights.106 In
contrast to the DMCA, which does not need to list the exceptions
for copyright infringement liability because these exceptions are
well-established by statute and case law,107 the Copyright Directive
sets forth a list of exceptions that are exhaustive—a member state
may apply any or all of the exceptions, but no others (except in
cases of analog use).108 For example, the Copyright Directive
specifically notes exemptions from liability for making temporary
copies and for certain nonprofit organizations.109
Moreover, unlike the DMCA, the Copyright Directive does not
provide broad insulation from liability for ISPs. At least one case
in the European Union, LICRA v. Yahoo!, held that ISPs may be
found liable for hosting certain illegal content or activities.110 This
ruling sharply contrasts section 512 of the DMCA and was not
enforced in the United States due to First Amendment concerns.111
A similar verdict in Germany clashes on all points with section 512
of the DMCA.112 In a suit filed in 1997 against America Online
(AOL), a German court ruled that AOL was liable for permitting
its subscribers to trade copyrighted files online.113
Despite these few minor differences, the Copyright Directive is
very similar to the DMCA. Like the DMCA’s section 1201, anticircumvention measures under article 6 of the Copyright Directive
remain within the control of copyright holders.114 Only those with
copyrights may allow their works to be reproduced, distributed,
and communicated to the public.115 In line with the U.S. first sale
doctrine, the Copyright Directive states that the copyright holder’s
106

See id.
See infra Part II.B (regarding the fair use doctrine and its applications in the United
States).
108
See infra Part II.B.
109
See Copyright Directive, supra note 8.
110
See La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’antisemitisme [LICRA] v. Yahoo!, TGI Paris,
Interim Order No. 00/05308, Nov. 20, 2001, http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/
001120yahoofrance.pdf.
111
See Yahoo! v. LICRA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
112
See Patricia Jacobus, AOL Found Guilty of Allowing Music Bootlegs, CNET
News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-239175.html (Apr. 12, 2000).
113
See id.
114
See Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 6.
115
See id.
107
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distribution right is exhausted within the European Union once the
holder markets the work in the European Union (but that does not
mean that the holder has exhausted the right outside the European
Union).116 The EU Software Directive, like 17 U.S.C. § 109 in the
United States, makes an exception to first sale for digital
distribution, advising that every distribution online should be
authorized where the copyright so provides.117 If a similar first
sale exception were applied to book sales, one would have to call
up the author and ask permission to sell the book to a used
bookstore. Remedies under the Software Directive are severe and
include the possibility of injunction, monetary damages, and
seizure of material and equipment, whether or not the person or
entity has actually infringed a copyright.118
Thus, using a similar approach to that of the United States, the
EU Copyright Directive aims to update copyright protection in the
wake of new peer-to-peer sharing and protect against the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of any technological measures
used to circumvent any restrictions placed by the copyright
holder.119 In comparing it to the United States’ approach, the
Copyright Directive can be best analogized to the DMCA, in
which a copyright holder must have some technological measure in
place before the creator or user of a circumvention program can be
held liable under article 6.120 In cases not involving anticircumvention devices, courts in the European Union, possibly in
the interest of international harmonization, will likely rely on
analysis similar to Napster II. In other words, instead of stretching
the Copyright Directive to fit non-anti-circumvention devices, the
EU courts may use similar reasoning to U.S. courts to find liability
over the new peer-to-peer services.

116

See id.
See Software Directive, supra note 20, recitals 28–29.
118
See Software Directive, supra note 20, art. 8.
119
See Richard Menta, Europe Passes “Napster” Law, MP3 Newswire, at
http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2001/eu.html (Feb. 14, 2001).
120
Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 6. The Copyright Directive, however, makes
no mention of notice required on behalf of copyright holders to be given to a person or
entity accused of contributory or vicarious infringement. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2000)
(outlining the DMCA’s notification provision).
117
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B. Fair Use: A Defense to Copyright Infringement at Home but
Not Abroad
The most common defense to copyright infringement is fair
use. The nature of fair use usually involves weighing policies on a
case-by-case basis. In the United States, under section 107 of the
Copyright Act, four public interests are identified: (1) the purpose
and character of the use, including its commercial nature; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the proportion that was
“taken”; and (4) the economic impact of the “taking.”121 No single
element is decisive, but the first, the purpose and character of the
use, and the fourth, the economic impact of the taking, are
generally the most influential.122 While much of the U.S.
exemptions for fair use developed through case law, the EU
Copyright Directive specifically allows fair use in teaching,
scientific research, and social commentary.123 It also advises that
the exceptions and limitations the member states provide “duly
reflect the increased economic impact that such exceptions or
limitations may have in the context of the new electronic
environment.”124 The DMCA, however, provides very few
exceptions for liability when a protective measure is circumvented.
Unlike case law that has recognized the legitimacy of making
copies for personal use and individual teaching, the DMCA
permits the use of circumvention tools only for nonprofit libraries,
archives, educational institutions,125 law enforcement agencies, and
very limited reverse engineering research.126 It is worth noting,

121

17 U.S.C. § 107.
See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–51 (1984)
(considering the first and fourth fair use elements to be dispositive).
123
See Copyright Directive, supra note 8.
124
Id. recital 44; see also id. art. 5 (setting forth the exceptions and limitations).
125
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d). An extra limitation is placed on this exception for these
three groups: They may access the work “solely in order to make a good faith
determination of whether to acquire a copy,” and only if “an identical copy of that work
is not reasonably available in another form.” Id.
126
See id. § 1201(d)–(f). The ban on circumvention of protection applies even when a
later use of the work (and the reason for circumventing the protection) would be legal
under doctrines of fair use. See Jason Young, Digital Copyright Reform in Canada:
Reflections on WIPO and the DMCA, Apr. 26, 2002, available at
http://www.lexinformatica.org/dox/digitalcopyright.pdf. For example, a professor is
122
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however, that for qualified parties to get the tools to circumvent the
protection, some other party would likely have to be the creator,
and this nonexempt creator of the circumvention measures would
then be liable under the DMCA.127
The major case relied on by defendants in music downloading
suits is Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,128 in which
television companies accused the manufacturer of home video tape
recorders of contributory infringement. The Supreme Court, in
applying the fair use factors, held that (1) the public should not be
prohibited from taping educational, religious, or other programs
authorized to be taped by the copyright holders for noncommercial
use; (2) there was no likelihood of harm to the market shown; and
(3) the tape recorder was capable of substantial noninfringing uses,
even though over eighty percent of users’ activity constituted
actionable infringement.129 Since Sony, however, fair use has
generally not been a successful argument in digital downloading
cases, most likely due to the allegedly wide economic impact of
displacing sales of music with free downloaded tracks.130
While it would appear that the European Union intended to
follow the U.S. implementation of the WIPO treaties with the EU
Copyright Directive, and therefore reach similar results in
copyright cases as U.S. courts, a member state recently called the
attempt at European and global copyright harmonization into
question. On November 29, 2001, the Amsterdam District Court
held that the creators of Kazaa, a peer-to-peer file-sharing program
that has been downloaded more than 223 million times,131 were
liable for copyright infringement and had to take measures to

liable under the DMCA if he or she breaks protection on a DVD to copy it only for the
fair use purpose of showing a scene from the movie in class. See id.
127
See id. It makes sense to think that libraries will look to a third party to develop the
complicated software to break the protective codes on copyrighted works.
128
464 U.S. 417 (1984). The infringement that the defendants were allegedly
contributing to was the home taping of copyrighted television programs and movies. See
id. at 420.
129
See id. at 456.
130
See, e.g., Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
131
See http://www.kazaa.com (last visited May 11, 2003).

LACKMAN FORMAT.DOC

2003]

TRANSATLANTIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

4/27/16 12:26 PM

1181

terminate the infringements.132 On March 28, 2002, however, the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal reversed the ruling.133 The Court of
Appeal’s decision embraced fair use principles, noting that
Kazaa’s computer program is not exclusively used for
downloading copyrighted works.134 Instead of focusing on the
imposition of contributory or vicarious liability on the defendants,
the Court of Appeal placed the primary responsibility in the
individual users’ hands, explaining that, like Sony’s production of
the VCR, “[p]roviding the means for publication or reproduction of
copyright protected works is not an act of publication or
reproduction in its own right.”135 Perhaps most significantly, the
Court of Appeal emphasized that it was impossible for Kazaa to
monitor users’ file sharing and therefore impossible to “incorporate
a blockage against the unlawful exchange of files,” even if it
received notice from the copyright holders.136 Thus, while the
Napster decisions have eroded the principles of Sony in the United
States, there is at least one court in Europe trying to revive fair use
and protection for new technologies as they existed under Sony.
The Kazaa decision was the first to protect a file-sharing
company against copyright liability, but it is unclear whether this is
an influential trend that could threaten the goal of harmonization or
132

See Noot bij Kazaa/Buma-Stemra, Hof, Amsterdam, 28 maart 2002, rolnr. 1370/01
(ann. SKG), unofficial translation available at http://www.steptoe.com/webdoc.nsf/Files/
196e/$file/196e.pdf [hereinafter Kazaa].
133
See id.
134
See id. The court relied on an expert report submitted by Kazaa:
Is KaZaA exclusively suited for the exchange of music files? Absolutely
not. KaZaA is particularly well suited for certain types of files containing
metadata and it is user-friendly. This does include MP3, a popular format for
the exchange of music. However, KaZaA is also used for the exchange of
Microsoft Word files. Furthermore, apart from the exchange of music, the
exchange of jokes is also very popular among KaZaA users.
KaZaA is very well suited as a communication tool for communities that are
autonomous, that do not want to make use of a central service but that still have
to exchange files. Examples would be:
• Freelance photographers
• Real estate agents
• Citizens who want to publish things.
Id. ¶ 4.4 (quoting Dr. E. Huizer’s expert report).
135
Id. ¶ 4.9.
136
Id. ¶ 4.4 (quoting Dr. E. Huizer’s expert report).
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a mere anomaly.137 “[The Kazaa decision] doesn’t bind American
courts, but it could weaken the overall structure of international
copyright law if other countries begin offering safe havens to
companies,” said Bruce Lehman, who helped develop a substantial
portion of the DMCA.138 The decision may also conflict with the
goals of the WIPO treaties and the EU Copyright Directive, which
suggests that the member states may not be implementing the laws
as seriously as intended and will have a difficult time doing so.139
While piracy havens abound throughout the world, a haven in the
Netherlands could isolate American interests in copyright from the
European Union in practice, and not just in theory.140 Kazaa is
also being sued in the United States, which is not bound by the
Dutch precedent; the Netherlands decision could influence
domestic courts’ analysis, however, in a bid for harmonization.141
On the other hand, the Kazaa ruling can be viewed not as the
result of an erratic court, but as a statement that fits squarely within
RealNetworks and Sony. If the Court of Appeal had followed
analysis analogous to the RealNetworks court (in its application of
the DMCA) and considered the Copyright Directive, it would have
found that Kazaa was not an anti-circumvention measure and thus
not liable under article 6 of the Copyright Directive.142 Just as the
U.S. courts did in Sony and RealNetworks, the Dutch court applied
the contributory infringement test and found other substantial legal
and noninfringing uses for the Kazaa program, such as sharing
personal photo albums too large to be sent by e-mail or songs that
the owner has given permission to distribute.143 This is not to say
137

See John Borland, Ruling Bolsters File-Traders’ Prospects, CNET News.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-870396.html (Mar. 28, 2002).
138
See Brad King, The Kazaa Ruling: What It Means, Wired News, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51457,00.html (Apr. 2, 2002).
139
See id.
140
See id.
141
See Borland, supra note 137.
142
See Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 6.
143
See Kazaa ¶ 4.9; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 446
(1984).
If there are millions of owners of [VCRs] who make copies of televised sports
events, religious broadcasts, and educational programs such as Mister Rogers’
Neighborhood, and if the proprietors of those programs welcome the practice,
the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible
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that Kazaa is consistent with U.S. law, however; it is directly at
odds with Napster II, which held that there would be liability if the
makers of the program knew about and materially contributed to
infringing activity, or if they had an interest in the infringing
activity and did nothing to stop it.144 Under the test used in
Napster II, the company that created Kazaa might be liable due to
its knowledge of the program’s wide infringing capabilities and the
substantial corporate investment and financial returns that the
company currently enjoys.145 Thus, when the District Court in
California rules on the case in the United States involving the suit
against Kazaa,146 it might reach a completely different result from
the Supreme Court in Sony and the Court of Appeal in the
Netherlands.
C. Applying Our Legal Standards to New Technologies
Since the fall of Napster, the nature of downloading music and
movies has changed.147 File-sharing programs no longer need a
Napster-like central server and instead connect individual users
directly with other users.148 In February 2001, Napster had twentysix million users in thirteen different countries; in January 2003,
Kazaa counted sixty million users around the world, with twentytwo million in the United States.149
One of the major problems in suing a company like Kazaa is
the lack of global copyright harmonization. With so many
should not be stifled simply because the equipment is used by some individuals
to make unauthorized reproductions of respondents’ works.
Id.
144

See Napster I, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–24 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
See Todd Woody, The Race to Kill Kazaa, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 106. It is worth
noting that the Sony court did not reach the issue of profit for Sony through sales of the
VCR because “time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a
noncommercial, nonprofit activity.” See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
146
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (finding jurisdiction over Sharman Networks, owners of the Kazaa program, and
consolidating the suit against it with the suits against Grokster and Streamcast). All three
programs use the FastTrack software. Id. at 1080.
147
See Mann, supra note 89.
148
See id.
149
See Grace J. Bergen, The Napster Case: The Whole World Is Listening, 15
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 259, 260 (2002); Woody, supra note 145.
145
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standards around the world, it is difficult to get jurisdiction in the
United States or any EU country that may have ratified the
Copyright Directive when Kazaa can just set up shop somewhere
else.150 In addition, peer-to-peer services like Kazaa, Morpheus,
and Gnutella have no central server, which makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the companies to monitor file swapping.151 This
legally significant difference from the structure of Napster may
cause the new peer-to-peer services, even if brought under the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, to fall outside the scope of vicarious
and contributory infringement liability. Even though few argued
that Napster was a direct infringer, the record companies
succeeded in getting an injunction against Napster under theories
of contributory and vicarious liability.152 If copyright holders are
unable to demonstrate contributory or vicarious liability, peer-topeer services could meet the Sony fair use test in the same way that
Kazaa did in the Netherlands.
In interpreting digital downloading cases, at least in the United
States, courts have shied away from the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Sony. Instead of emphasizing the importance of fair
use and embracing the positive uses of the new technology, they
have generally ignored fair use and focused almost exclusively on
the negative uses: “Courts have not allowed the defense that
infringing uses may have stimulated sales in some instances. To
measure harm, courts have considered whether the defendant’s use
diminishes or prejudices potential sales, interferes with
marketability, or fulfills the demand for the original.”153 Thus,
when cases are decided in the United States, it is unlikely that the
courts will find Kazaa to be more like the Betamax VCR than like
Napster.154 In cases of digital downloading, therefore, it appears
that the fair use test is less likely to be used as a test that balances

150

See Woody, supra note 145.
See Jed Scully, Beyond Napster—Is It Just Music? Or Are Judicial Resolutions
Ineffective in Digital Commerce?, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 313, 318 (2002).
152
See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
153
See Michael A. Einhorn, Copyright, Prevention, and Rational Governance: FileSharing and Napster, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 449, 452 (2001).
154
See id.
151
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public interests, as in Sony,155 than as a basis for finding and
affirming liability, as in Napster II.156
The continuing and rampant exchange of copyrighted files on
the Internet makes it evident that record companies’ lawsuits, no
matter how favorable the outcomes, have not been very effective in
deterring creators or users of file-trading software.157 There are
two primary reasons for this: (1) it can be difficult to get
jurisdiction over the creators of non-U.S. peer-to-peer companies,
and (2) once the programs are out on the Internet, it is difficult for
the creators to stop the use of their programs.158 As these
weaknesses in legal solutions become more problematic, record
companies will attempt to fill the gaps by using other nonlegal
(and possibly illegal), technical solutions to solve the problem of
file-sharing among individuals.
1. Jurisdiction
Before a court can apply the standard of contributory or
vicarious infringement to new peer-to-peer services that do not
have a central server, the court must first determine whether such
services fall under its jurisdiction. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios v. Grokster, it was easy to assert jurisdiction over Grokster
and Streamcast (which developed the program Morpheus) because
the companies were based in the United States. However, the U.S.
District Court in the Central District of California had to analyze
Sharman Networks, which owns the Kazaa interface, more closely
to determine whether it conducted enough business in the United
States to be subject to jurisdiction there.159 Sharman, which owns
the Kazaa interface, was formed in the small island nation of
155

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)
(“All reproductions of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of the
copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any individual may reproduce a
copyrighted [work] for a ‘fair use’; the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive
right to such a use.”).
156
See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014–17.
157
See supra text accompanying notes 2–12.
158
See Jerome Kuptz, Gnutella: Unstoppable by Design, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 236
(providing an excellent diagram of how peer-to-peer services are virtually unstoppable).
159
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
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Vanuatu and does business primarily in Australia, but runs its
servers in Denmark and keeps its software in Estonia.160 The
California court found specific personal jurisdiction: “Sharman
engages in a significant quantum of commercial contact with
California residents constituting a but for cause of Plaintiffs’
claims. Jurisdiction is therefore presumptively reasonable.”161
The court’s personal jurisdiction analysis will likely be influential
in lawsuits against other non-U.S. peer-to-peer services. Over the
past few years, courts have evaluated how traditional notions of
jurisdiction apply to Internet-based businesses. Such cases may
provide guidance as to whether (1) a peer-to-peer provider has
sufficient “minimum contacts” with the United States, (2) the
claim asserted against the provider arises out of those contacts, and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.162
In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., a district
court considered whether an online news service infringed a
company’s trademark.163 The most significant connection between
the online service and the forum state arose from its subscription
service; approximately two percent of its 14,000 subscribers were
from the state.164 In addition, the online service had entered into
seven agreements with ISPs in the state to allow subscribers to
access the news service.165 The court reasoned that
the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity
conducts over the Internet. . . . If the defendant enters into
contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that
involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. . . .
A passive Web site that does little more than make

160

See id. at 1080.
Id. at 1088.
162
See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122–23 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
163
See id. at 1119.
164
See id. at 1121.
165
See id.
161
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information available to those who are interested in it is not
grounds for the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction.166
In unclear cases that occupy the middle ground, “the exercise of
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity
and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs
on the Web site.”167
While the court held that the online service purposely availed
itself of doing business in the state based on its online transactions
and contracts with ISPs within the forum,168 a peer-to-peer service
company could argue that the choice of whether to provide its
services to residents of the United States is not within its control.
Once a person downloads a program that does not require a central
server to transmit search requests or files, anyone around the world
can download a copy of the program from that user. This would
distinguish a peer-to-peer service company from the defendant in
Zippo, where the court noted that “Dot Com repeatedly and
consciously chose” to make contact with the forum state.169 Based
on the recommendations of the Zippo court, however, it might be
foreseeable that the program could cause commercial harm to
companies in the United States.170 Thus, services like Kazaa or
Grokster may have difficulty escaping U.S. jurisdiction no matter
where they try to hide.
Other cases would also support a finding of personal
jurisdiction over peer-to-peer providers based on their effects in
the United States, possibly conferring jurisdiction over a peer-topeer defendant wherever the effects are felt. In Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen, the court found personal
jurisdiction over the defendant partially because the defendant had
registered the “Panavision” domain name “with the knowledge that
the names belonged to plaintiff and with the intent to interfere with

166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 1124.
Id.
See id. at 1125–26.
Id. at 1127.
See id. at 1126–27.
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[plaintiff’s] business.”171 While companies like Sharman may
argue that they do not intend to interfere with record companies’
business, their success, whether monetary or not,172 has come
largely in part from their programs’ ability to find and download
copyrighted works. Thus, although only one recent case at the trial
court level is directly on point for peer-to-peer services,173 record
companies continue to claim that the wild popularity of the
programs among millions of American users causes them harm.
Other courts, therefore, may find this harm sufficient in most peerto-peer situations to assert the requisite personal jurisdiction to
bring the programs’ creators and distributors into a U.S. court.174
2. Supervision and Contributory/Vicarious Liability
After finding jurisdiction, courts will turn to the Napster II test
to determine whether the services are liable for contributory or
vicarious infringement.175
The imposition of liability for
contributory infringement in Napster II rested on the finding that
Napster knew or had reason to know of its users’ direct
infringement.176 Under Sony, Napster may have been absolved
from the knowledge standard where the program was “capable of
both infringing and ‘substantial noninfringing uses.’”177
The Ninth Circuit found that Napster did have potentially
valuable uses and would not itself impute the requisite level of
knowledge for contributory liability to Napster.178 Based solely on
the findings of the limited record below, however, the Ninth
Circuit found no error and upheld the trial court’s finding of

171

Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
Panavision was decided in the same court that is considering Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios.
172
Kazaa’s financial success, attained despite spending virtually nothing on its content,
will make its battle extremely difficult. It earned millions in 2002 from U.S. advertisers
such as Netflix and DirecTV. See Woody, supra note 145, at 106.
173
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
174
See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 621.
175
See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–24 (9th Cir. 2001).
176
See id. at 1021.
177
Id. at 1020 (citation omitted).
178
See id. at 1021.
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knowledge.179 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is very important
when considering the new peer-to-peer services’ liability, as it has
already recognized that these services are “capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses.”180 When a trial
court reviews a similar case in the future, it may be obligated to
use the Ninth Circuit’s finding in its analysis, potentially allowing
new peer-to-peer services in the post-Napster world to hide from
liability under the Sony umbrella.
The Ninth Circuit found that Napster’s failure to remove
infringing works after having received specific notice from
copyright holders satisfied the knowledge requirement for
contributory liability.181 Applying the rationale from Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,182
the Ninth Circuit agreed that “if a computer system operator learns
of specific infringing material and fails to purge such material from
the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct
infringement.”183 The court also noted, however, that,
absent any specific information which identifies infringing
activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the
system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material. To enjoin
simply because a computer network allows for infringing use
would, in our opinion, violate Sony and potentially restrict activity
unrelated to infringing use.184
The court concluded that the record from the trial court
supported a finding of actual knowledge of specific infringing
material on its system.185 The court, thus, found that Napster was
contributorily liable because Napster was aware of the infringing
material and possessed the capability to block access, but failed to
do so.186
179

See id. at 1021–22. The record below did not consider potential uses of the program.
See id. at 1021.
180
Id. at 1021.
181
See id. at 1022.
182
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
183
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021.
184
Id. (citation omitted).
185
See id. at 1022.
186
See id.
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The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of contributory liability provides
guidance for peer-to-peer services that are capable of blocking
access and removing infringing material, but the new breed of
distributed networks cannot follow suit.
If a finding of
contributory liability depends solely on notice of infringing
material,187 then programs like Kazaa and Gnutella would be
liable. If such liability rests on the ability to block and remove
infringing material,188 however, the distributed network services
would escape liability. Unfortunately, the Napster II decision
provides little guidance on what precisely triggers contributory
liability; it is, therefore, difficult to predict how a court would rule
on a case involving a distributed network.
Vicarious liability applies when the defendant “has the right
and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct
financial interest in such activities.”189 The Ninth Circuit in
Napster II held that financial benefit is present “where the
availability of infringing material acts as a ‘draw’ for
customers.”190 Although Napster had virtually no outside income
at the time, its future income would have presumably been
dependent on the number of users that its free service would
attract.191 Kazaa is a perfect example of this; its large user base
has allowed it to accrue actual and substantial revenue from
advertisers.192
Despite a finding of financial benefit, the post-Napster peer-topeer services might escape vicarious liability on the prong of
supervision. The Ninth Circuit’s standard for such liability rested
on the principle that “[t]he ability to block infringers’ access to a
particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of
the right and ability to supervise.”193 While the court held that
Napster was able to police its system by finding infringing material
on its search indexes and terminating users’ access to the
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

See id. at 1020–22.
See id.
Id. at 1022 (quotations omitted).
Id.
See id.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023.
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system,194 the new peer-to-peer services are differently situated.
Due to their distributed networks and no server through which
requests must pass, it is unlikely that they would be able to find the
infringing works195 or terminate users’ use of the program.196 In a
case involving a new peer-to-peer system, therefore, courts would
likely determine that there is insufficient supervision to hold the
company vicariously liable.
Each program may give rise to different facts. For example, it
is very likely that the record industry will not sue Gnutella, not
only because of the potential legal challenges, but particularly
because one of the five major record companies is responsible for
its creation.197 The other possibility is to sue the users of the
program, but they are extremely difficult to track, and the costs of
litigation would likely exceed the award that would be recovered
from the average user.198 Finally, unlike Kazaa, Gnutella obtains
no financial benefit from users’ distribution and usage of the
program, and this lack of present or future financial benefit could
absolve Gnutella from vicarious liability.199
3. Copyright Holders’ Out-of-Court Tactics
While the courts and legislatures ruminate over what to do
about the problems posed by the new peer-to-peer services that
have no central server to shut down, copyright holders have sought
solutions other than suing the services. For example, in early
2001, Belgian police raided the residences of Internet users for
violations of copyright law, after a music industry organization
claimed it was able to track users’ heavy downloading of
194

See id. at 1024.
See Mann, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
196
See Wolk, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
197
Justin Frankel and Tom Pepper of Nullsoft, a subsidiary of America Online [AOL],
developed the Gnutella program in a form that could defeat the attempts of network
administrators to block it; many administrators had successfully blocked Napster from
their networks. See Giovanna Fessenden, Peer-to-Peer Technology: Analysis of
Contributory Infringement and Fair Use, 42 J.L. & TECH. 391 (2002). Two days after
Gnutella was released on the Internet in June 2000, AOL, recognizing that the program
could damage its newly-purchased record label, Time Warner Music Group, ended the
project and stopped access to the program. See id.
198
See id.
199
See id.; see also Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023.
195
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copyrighted files.200 Tactics on this side of the Atlantic have been
even more intense. Some of the major record companies have
hired technology firms to spy on networks to identify large-scale
infringers, “spoof”201 MP3s,202 or use interdiction.203 Legislation
to legalize interdiction and other similar forms of attack is
currently before Congress.204
Record companies themselves have developed some attempts
at solving the problem. One method that may prove to be
successful is watermarking, which allows tracking of song copies
around the world.205 Other solutions have not had so much luck:
copy protection on CDs turned out to be expensive and possibly
unconstitutional, while causing many users’ computers to crash.206
Another scheme, Sony’s Key2Audio copy protection, could be
easily eliminated by using a felt-tip pen, and hackers could easily
figure out how to crack the protection software codes.207
Copy protection also created opposition in other nations. In
Australia, after hearing about Universal’s plan to release copyprotected CDs, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission told manufacturers to put labels on CDs to warn
consumers that the protected CDs might not play in CD-ROM
drives.208 In Europe, Sony released millions of its copy-protected
200

See J. Jeffrey Landen, Beyond Napster: An Enforcement Crisis in Copyright Law?,
28 N. KY. L. REV. 713, 717–18 (2001).
201
“Spoofing” involves creating media files that are disguised as popular songs. When
someone downloads the spoofed file, he or she finds that it is some other track, often a
repetitious—and annoying—loop of part of the song’s chorus.
202
“MP3 (MPEG-1 Audio Layer-3) is a standard technology and format for
compression a sound sequence into a very small file (about one-twelfth the size of the
original file) while preserving the original level of sound quality when it is played.” MP3,
Whatis.com, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci212600,00.html (last
updated July 27, 2001).
203
Use interdiction involves flooding a user with a large harbor of copyrighted material
and sending that user so many requests that other users cannot get their requests through.
See Jeff Howe, Under Cover, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 97.
204
See id.
205
See Jeff Howe, Dirty Dozen, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 98. Watermarking entails
“[d]igitally stamping each track on an advance CD so you can hunt down and punish
whoever uploads it to the world.” Id.
206
See id.
207
See id.
208
See Bergen, supra note 149, at 274.
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CDs with the warning that the CD should not be played in either
PC or Macintosh CD drives because the Key2Audio protection
software would cause the computers to crash.209 In April 2002,
Warner Music Japan began testing protection on CDs that would
also contain warnings, but this kind would prevent the copying of
songs onto users’ computers.210
Despite these obstacles, where countries follow a strict
DMCA-like law, copyright holders have been encouraged to
develop technological measures. This is because under a DMCAlike regime, the plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that a person
who makes a copy used a tool to circumvent the protection to
prove infringement. The defense of fair use is thus not available.
In countries that favor fair use, however, these technological
measures might run counter to long-established laws that permit
owners of a work to make a copy for their own personal use.
Finally, in addition to suing creators of file-sharing programs,
the record industry has begun to consider suing individuals that
offer large quantities of songs on their hard drives.211 The
companies have been a little cautious about using this approach,
however, because of the potential backlash from consumers.212 In
addition, companies like AOL Time Warner had been hesitant to
take this route because it could mean suing AOL Internet users,
which in turn would mean forcing the ISP to track down and reveal
the name of the users.213
A recent case, however, cleared some hurdles for those
pursuing individual cyber infringers of copyrights. In In re
Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,214 the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA)215 sought to enforce a subpoena
served on Verizon, an ISP, to learn the identity of a Verizon user

209

See id.
See id. at 275.
211
See Anna W. Mathews & Bruce Orwall, Industry to Sue People Abetting Net Song
Swaps, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2002, at B1.
212
See id. at B3
213
See id.
214
240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
215
The RIAA represents most, but not all, owners of copyrights in sound recordings.
See Richard D. Rose, Connecting the Dots, 42 J.L. & Tech. 313 (2002).
210
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who downloaded over 600 songs in a single day.216 The court held
that “the subpoena power in 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) applies to all
Internet service providers within the scope of the DMCA, not just
to those service providers storing information on a system or
network at the direction of the user.”217 Therefore, compliance
with section 512(h) is a prerequisite for an ISP to receive section
512’s insulation from liability for contributory or vicarious
copyright infringement.218 This requirement applies whether or
not “infringed material is stored or controlled on the [ISP’s] system
or network.219 The court was particularly concerned about the
loophole it would create if all ISPs were not included under the
subpoena power.220 ISPs are very concerned that “bots,” a
program that can search the Internet for infringement, will flood
ISPs with countless automatically-generated subpoenas.221
Although bots did not exist when the DMCA was passed in 1998,
the court deferred to Congress to solve the bot problem.222 It will
be difficult for the bot to figure out whether the detected use is
considered fair use or not, and with the ability of “ghosting,” or
disguising an Internet protocol address as a different one, “[t]he
chance for error is very high, and the risk to privacy is very high as

216

Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
Id. Section 512(h) provides:
Request. A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner’s
behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a
subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in
accordance with this subsection.
...
Actions of service provider receiving subpoena. Upon receipt of the issued
subpoena . . . the service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright
owner or person authorized by the copyright owner the information required by
the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provision of law and regardless of
whether the service provider responds to the notification.
17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1), (5) (2000).
218
See Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 26
219
Id. at 29.
220
See id. at 35 (finding that “under Verizon’s reading of the [DMCA], a significant
amount of potential copyright infringement would be shielded from the subpoena
authority of the DMCA”).
221
See id. at 38.
222
See id. at 39.
217
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well.”223 With the possibility of accusations that are not reviewed
by a legal body, the error can lead to revelations of private
information, even when the person whose information is turned
over to the RIAA turns out to be innocent of the charges.224 Thus,
the ire the music industry is already facing from “waging war”
against file-sharers may spread to ISPs in the United States and
any other countries that follow a similar legal interpretation.225
III.

BALANCING LAW AND POLICY TO CREATE PROPER
SOLUTIONS

A. Rethinking Copyright
Some argue that like Betamax, the Internet will fail to
eliminate the creativity that copyright was designed to foster.
Although many courts have not allowed the argument that
infringing use may actually increase sales,226 it may be worthwhile
if courts instead consider whether they are basing their opinions on
an outdated doctrine. The new forms of artistic and literary
distribution that now exist via the Internet have exposed the true
beneficiaries of copyright law and raised questions as to whether
copyright is workable or even desirable in the digital age.
The typical argument that the record industry has been using is
that if artists cannot get paid, there will be no good music out
there, despite that the industry has demonstrated for years “that
223

Simon Glickman, Judge Orders Verizon to Give Up Mega-Swapper: It’s Privacy vs.
Piracy as RIAA Wins Round in District Court—But Are Rights-Holders Downloading
More Trouble?, Hits Daily Double, at http://www.hitsdailydouble.com/news/
newsPage.cgi?news04056m01 (Jan. 21, 2003).
224
See id.
225
See id.
226
See Einhorn, supra note 153, at 452; cf. also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 453 n.38 (1984).
Today, the larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price
plaintiffs [the copyright owners] can demand from broadcasters from rerun
rights. There is no survey within the knowledge of this court to show that the
rerun audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program. In any
event, if ratings can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase
and, given market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them.
Id.
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when musicians are not fairly paid, they continue to play, write
songs, perform at concerts, and cut records.”227 In addition,
relatively few artists have spoken out against digital downloading;
some have even encouraged it.228 Rock singer Courtney Love has
repeatedly expressed her frustration with the industry, saying that
she will “allow millions of people to get [her] music for nothing if
they want and hopefully they’ll be kind enough to leave a tip if
they like it.”229 The sentiment among artists today is reminiscent
of that of the successful band The Grateful Dead, who encouraged
fans to tape its live performances.230 The few artists that have
spoken out against downloading include pop star Britney Spears,
who is ironically a singer of, at best, questionable creativity.231
Indeed, it might be time to ask whether we need copyright at
all if “Science and useful Arts”232 are already, and have always
been, progressing. Before the Statute of Anne,233 the world’s first
modern copyright law, was passed in 1710, “Sophocles, Dante, da
Vinci, Botticelli, Michaelangelo, Shakespeare, Newton, Cervantes,
[and] Bach . . . all found reasons to get out of bed in the morning
without expecting to own the works they created.”234 Today,
mp3.com contains music from thousands of artists who make it
available on the site for free;235 scholarly articles, short stories, and
poetry are ubiquitous on the web; and hundreds of grandmothers
have learned to use the Internet so they can post recipes online.
For all these people who have been a part of the progression of
literature and the arts, strict copyright control is in the back of their
minds, far behind the human urge to create.
It may also be time to consider the positive economic effects of
new technology that can develop when copyright law is not
enforced on strict terms. Even though virtually everyone owns a
227

LITMAN, supra note 71, at 168.
See Mathews & Orwall, supra note 207.
229
Courtney Love, Courtney Love Does the Math, Salon.com, at http://www.salon.com/
tech/feature/2000/06/14/love (June 14, 2000).
230
See John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 240.
231
See Howe, supra note 205.
232
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
233
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
234
See Barlow, supra note 230.
235
See http://www.mp3.com.
228
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VCR, revenues from movies are higher than ever, and the film
industry has become dependent on videotape sales and rentals for
half of its income.236 From 1998 to 2000, the first two years that
MP3s were available on the Internet, CD sales rose by twenty
percent.237 In addition, concert ticket sales earned a record $2.1
billion in economically-depressed 2002, which was also the fourth
straight year that concert receipts hit record totals.238 The
marketing abilities of the Internet may have caused more people
with less disposable income to shell out money for these acts, just
like the bootlegged tapes of Grateful Dead shows did in the late
1960s.239
Instead of viewing CDs as the main product, the new postcopyright world may use music as promotional material to sell
concert tickets, t-shirts, special-edition movies and print material,
as well as the occasional CD. Also, just like with waiters, even if
there is no legal obligation to tip an artist, fans who download
music might leave some money on the table because “it’s the right
thing to do.”240 The tip might not be $16.98 per album, but
without the costs of packaging and distribution, the artists that only
create because they get paid might end up keeping a greater share
of the money for themselves than they would have if a CD had
sold in a store anyway.241 The group that would lose the most in a
post-copyright world would be the record and distribution
executives, who, through the RIAA, were recently found to be

236

See Barlow, supra note 230.
See id.
238
See 2002 Year End Business Analysis, Poll Star Online, at
http://www.pollstaronline.com/sf-ye2002-biz.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
239
See Barlow, supra note 230 (noting that “the tapes [became] a marketing virus that
would spawn enough Deadheads to fill any stadium in America”).
240
Id. at 252.
241
One group that has spoken out more vehemently against free digital downloading
than most is Metallica, a band that in a 1996 lawsuit against its record label, Elektra
Entertainment, gave itself the party name “We’re Only in It for the Music.” See We’re
Only in It for the Music v. Elektra Entertainment, No. 9644007 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1996). In
the battle involving Napster, Metallica changed its priorities; the band sued not only
Napster, but also several universities that provided Internet access to students. See John
Borland, Napster, Universities Sued by Metallica, News.com, at http://news.com.com/
2100-1023-239263.html (Apr. 13, 2000).
237
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responsible for overcharging consumers by $500 million.242 Thus,
it is doubtful that the music industry would get any sympathy from
lawmakers that it does not buy,243 and it is questionable whether
the music industry would survive in a post-copyright world. The
death of the industry would not necessarily equate to the death of
creativity, however, and a new, more efficient industry may even
rise out of the ashes until the next technological bombshell comes
around.
B. Striking a Balance in the Copyright Bargain
It is highly unlikely that the world will make such a paradigm
shift that copyright will be eliminated in its entirety. The DMCA,
EU Directives, and Napster holdings, however, are ineffective,
inapplicable to the current state of technology, and virtually
obsolete. In addition, the current method of litigation has turned
copyright holders into kids at a carnival who seem to believe they
can win at this game of whack-a-mole. Therefore, a new approach
must be found, with the ultimate solution containing legal,
business, and technological elements; no one element will be able
to solve the problem.244
New and shifting differences in legal standards can create
confusion among both copyright holders and users, especially
when the overwhelming majority of the public does not understand
the subtle nuances that can exist in copyright legislation.245 This
could lead to difficult and extensive legal problems now that
copyright holders can identify and sue the direct infringers who are
using peer-to-peer services.246 We have already seen ample
242

See Jake Chessum, David Boies: The Wired Interview, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 258. A
settlement has just been reached that provides a cash payment of $67.4 million and $75.7
million
in
CDs
to
the
public.
See
CD
MAP
Settlement,
at
http://www.musiccdsettlement.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
243
The industry does pay, however; the RIAA contributed $124,000 to both parties in
2002. See Howe, supra note 205.
244
See Julia Hanna, Peer-to-Peer: Has the Music Stopped?, Harv. Bus. Sch. Working
Knowledge, at http://hbsworkingknowledge.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml (Feb. 11, 2003)
(“‘Legal action should not be the only tool in the game.’ . . . ‘There are always
loopholes, and legal actions take a long time to work their way through the courts.’”
(quoting Tsvi Gal, CIO of Warner Music Group)).
245
See Bergen, supra note 149, at 272.
246
See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).

LACKMAN FORMAT.DOC

2003]

TRANSATLANTIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

4/27/16 12:26 PM

1199

evidence that the public does not believe it is doing something
morally or legally wrong when it downloads copyrighted works.247
Those versed in copyright terminology call downloading a file for
personal use “fair use,” while others believe that so long as they
are not selling the works they are sharing online, they are not
criminals.248 Under the No Electronic Theft Act (herinafter “NET
Act”), however, a person who infringes copyrights in excess of
$1,000 in retail value within a 180-day period is a criminal and
may be imprisoned for up to ten years.249 Even if the government
and the entertainment industries begin to enforce the NET Act
against the public, the amount of people downloading enough
material to meet $1,000 will be very small.250 In addition, the
violators will be difficult to identify without strong involvement
from ISPs, and the entertainment companies might enrage the
public to the point that the public boycotts products from
companies that enforce the NET Act.251
In the history of copyright, several goals for copyright have
come up in legislatures and courts.252 These goals include
balancing copyright against the advancement of technology and
protection of the public’s rights to access the works, protect their
privacy, and express themselves freely.253 In the digital age,
however, U.S. and EU legislatures and courts have ignored these
historically important and fundamental goals.254 In regard to
technological advancement, what lawmakers should do is rewrite
the rules so that new parties have a chance to invest in and develop
the new media and technologies.255
247

See Landen, supra note 200, at 714.
Id.
249
See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000).
250
See Fessenden, supra note 197.
251
See id.
252
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
253
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
254
See supra Part II.C (describing how Napster I and Verizon have given less
importance to fair use and privacy in favor of controlling infringement).
255
See LITMAN, supra note 71, at 173.
History tells us that [entrepreneurs] do invest without paying attention to
conventional wisdom. . . . Apparently, many entrepreneurs conclude that if
something is valuable, a way will be found to charge for it, so they concentrate
248
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While the DMCA prevents any circumvention of copyright
protection, it would be advantageous to the progress of technology
to allow reverse engineers, analysts, critics, and even derivative
users to make fair use of many works available online.256 Value
has been created in the past even when the underlying product is
offered for free. For example, broadcasters realized that they could
earn money through advertising, while AOL achieved market
dominance by giving away software.257 Also, “industry observers
agree that at least half of all of the copies of software out there are
unauthorized, yet the software market is booming . . . .”258 These
facts suggest that the DMCA and the Copyright Directive may
stifle scientific and technological creativity that society has
historically tried to nurture.
When writing the new rules, one must consider not only the
technology industries, but the group that has been left out of the
bargaining process the most—the public. Congress described
copyright’s purpose as “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts,”259 and it is therefore logical to conclude that “the
public is entitled to expect access to the works that copyright
inspires. . . .
For much of this country’s history, public
dissemination was, except in very limited circumstances, a
condition of copyright protection.”260 This intent can be seen
everywhere from the existence and protection of fair use in the
copyright law to the expenditure of millions of dollars every year
in the maintenance and operation of museums across the
country.261
Indeed, when the Supreme Court handed down the Sony
decision, it ensured that its ruling would strongly emphasize the
public interest.262 Past and present lawsuits involving Internet
on getting market share first, and worry about profits—and the rules for making
them—later.
Id.
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

See Scully, supra note 151, at 322.
See LITMAN, supra note 71, at 174.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
LITMAN, supra note 71, at 175.
See id. at 176.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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downloading have failed to give the public interest such
importance, and current negotiations within the industry have left
out the public entirely.263 As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
however, “this task involves a difficult balance between the
interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of
their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand.”264 When it comes to forming laws
to fit the digital age, courts and legislatures must keep this balance
in the forefront before making hasty changes to the copyright laws
that could eliminate the public’s fair use rights.
In 1790, Congress limited copyright owners’ rights to the
printing, publishing, and sale of copyrighted works, with the owner
having no right to restrict public performances, adaptations,
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
“The copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.” . . . “‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.’”
Id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (quoting
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))).
263
For example, the RIAA and the Business Software Alliance agreed that if the
technology leaders oppose Congress’s efforts to broaden consumer rights, the RIAA will
oppose any legislation that requires developers of technological devices to build in
controls that block users’ ability to copy files. See Mike Darrah, Entertainment &
Technology Leaders Agree on Compromise?, Winamp.com, at http://www.winamp.com/
news.jhtml?articleid=9800http://www.winamp.com/news.jhtml (Jan. 15, 2003).
264
Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. The Supreme Court has actually suggested that the public
comes first:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an “author’s” creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. “The
sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly,” this Court has said, “lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.”
Id. at 431–32 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).

LACKMAN FORMAT.DOC

1202

4/27/16 12:26 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1161

translations, or displays of the work.265 Over time, however,
Congress added more rights to the bundle and “did not incorporate
specific exemptions for the general population in most of these
enactments because nobody showed up to ask for them.”266
Despite the broadening of rights, it was not until the enactment of
the DMCA that Congress gave copyright owners control over the
public’s ability to “look[] at, listen[] to, learn[] from or us[e]
copyrighted works.”267 The difficulty lies in distinguishing copies
that are a form of piracy from incidental copies made while
listening to, viewing, or improving works on digital media.268 In
both cases, copies are made, but both creators and the public lose
out when the DMCA and Copyright Directive ban incidental
copies in an effort to stop piracy.269
In addition to considering the historically important copyright
goals, one should also examine the public’s perspectives, beliefs,
and expectations about how copyright works when copyright law
is revised to fit the new digital age. For example, instead of
focusing on the number of “copies” made, the law could make a
distinction between “commercial” and “noncommercial” uses.
While this is a very different way of looking at copyright overall,
the commercial/noncommercial distinction already appears in
statutes and case law regarding fair use and vicarious liability.270
If a copyright owner can argue that another person’s use of the
work would violate the owner’s right to exploit the work to the
extent that a lawsuit could be brought against the user, then such a
use could be considered a violation of copyright law, while a
person’s sharing of a file over the Internet with a friend would not
be.271 While this test is quite blurry, delineating boundaries
between fair and unfair use has never been easy or clear. “The task
is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for [17 U.S.C. § 107],

265

See LITMAN, supra note 71, at 175–76.
Id. at 176.
267
Id. (emphasis omitted).
268
See id. at 178.
269
See id.
270
See supra Part II.B., C.
271
See LITMAN, supra note 71, at 181. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 already
tacitly allows such sharing of nondigital music recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
266
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like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”272
If we allow judges and jurors to work with the test, and
programmers to design new products that would fit the test,
however, the lines may become much brighter, more predictable,
and more in line with the true goals of copyright law.
Furthermore, returning the focus to the value of noninfringing uses
would increase the dissemination of works to the public and
promote technology for advancing the progress of science and the
arts.
In addition, a new legal solution might promote more
appropriate technological solutions that would not run afoul of
constitutional protections.273 For example, a company called
Altnet has developed a system in which users pay a small fee to
reliably download music of better quality than that which exists on
most peer-to-peer systems.274 Such a system would combine the
convenience of peer-to-peer services and the quality of authentic
CDs with a middle-of-the-road price—a combination that could
solve the problem of getting the public to pay authors for
copyrighted material while ensuring that the public right to access
the material is not destroyed.275 Until technology can distinguish
between actionable infringement and fair use online, and between
copyrighted material and works in the public domain on the
Internet, lawmakers and courts should err on the side of protecting
the public if they want to uphold the fundamental goals of
copyright.276
C. Harmonizing the New Laws
Perhaps one of the most important legal lessons that has come
out of all this legislation and litigation is that we are not very close
to global harmonization of copyright standards. Once the parties
272

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
See Declan McCullagh, Another Punch for Copy Protection, Wired News, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51400,00.html (Mar. 28, 2002) (discussing
Congressional involvement in copyright holders’ efforts to create mandatory copy
protection).
274
See Hanna, supra note 244.
275
See id.
276
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
273
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involved in reforming copyright law finally decide what the law
should be, however, it is of utmost importance to ensure that the
law is enforced across the board. This emphasis on harmonization
is nothing new; one of the primary goals of the 1886 Berne
Convention was to harmonize copyright law.277 TRIPS and the
WIPO treaties also aimed to harmonize copyright law.278 This
historical emphasis on the harmonization of copyright law should
be a fundamental basis for implementing new laws on a global
scale.
If laws on digital infringement for current and future peer-topeer services are to be truly harmonized, they must set forth a
workable and more predictable standard for analyzing the claims
that are brought into the courts, both in the United States and in the
European Union. If participating governments want laws and
verdicts harmonized, legislatures and courts will have to square
Sony and RealNetworks with Napster II to create a harmonious test
for vicarious and contributory infringement. In addition, owners of
copyrights in sound recordings would be wise to create some form
of technological security measure to affix to the recordings. Such
measures would assure the owners a better chance at succeeding in
a suit under section 1201 of the DMCA or article 6 of the
Copyright Directive.
Practical reasons for harmonizing copyright law also exist. For
example, if the Kazaa and Sony decisions are not resolved with
Napster II, creators and the public will likely take the safest paths
in publication and use to protect themselves from infringement and
liability respectively. A company such as AOL may uniformly
restrict its users’ access, even though it is insulated from liability in
the United States, based on the German court’s ruling that AOL
was liable for allowing people to share copyrighted material on its
service.279 It would be unwise as a matter of policy to let the edge

277

See Berne Convention, supra note 48. One of Berne’s goals was to “protect, in as
effective and uniform manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works.” Id. (emphasis added).
278
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 54; WCT, supra note 6, pmbl.; WPPT, supra note
6, pmbl.
279
See Jacobus, supra note 113.
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of this chilling effect replace the boundaries that countries have
developed through the legislatures and the courts.
Alternatively, true global harmonization, to the extent it can be
accomplished, can help to crack down on certain parties involved
in infringement, particularly those with whom copyright holders
are the most concerned. For example, international harmonization
may allow a country like the United States to fine a programmer
acting outside the United States, even though it is impractical to
arrest every user of a program once the program is out on the
Internet.280 Also, ISPs who are concerned about losing customers
in the wake of the Verizon decision will rest easier if most ISPs
around the world follow the same rules.281 Those copyright
holders who wish to collect damages would have a much easier
time if more countries enforced a uniform legal standard, and more
courts would be able to obtain jurisdiction over more parties.282
Finally, harmonized laws will be easier for the public to learn,
understand, and use.
If one state breaks an international agreement, however, that
divergence threatens the purposes behind harmonization of the
copyright laws, as well as the copyright laws’ legitimacy. For
example, after the Amsterdam Kazaa ruling, a programmer who
designs a new kind of file-sharing software can do his work from
the Netherlands, or from any other country that is not part of an
international copyright agreement. Even if that programmer were
subject to another court’s jurisdiction, the remedies would be
difficult to enforce in the programmer’s home country. Therefore,
because there is no evidence that harmonization treaties will bind
every nation to a single copyright law and assure that the law will
be enforced, the question arises as to whether the measures that the
United States and European Union have taken are effective and
280

See King, supra note 5.
See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003); Michelle
Delio,
DMCA:
Dow
What
It
Wants
to
Do,
Wired
News,
at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,57011,00.html (Dec. 31, 2002) (describing
how a user of an American ISP, when his service was severed after the ISP received a
complaint that the user was violating the DMCA by posting a parody site, has begun to
consider contracting his new service from European ISPs that have not yet implemented
the Copyright Directive).
282
See King, supra note 5.
281
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sufficient to protect those who hold the rights to digital sound
recordings. Thus far, the rampant piracy on the Internet suggests
that the current measures are ineffective and insufficient.
Revisions of current digital copyright law cannot come too
soon. The United States faces a threat to the measures already
imposed under the DMCA; courts have been hearing arguments
that the DMCA violates due process, fair use, and First
Amendment protections; and new bills have been introduced in the
House of Representatives that try to address the over-inclusiveness
of the DMCA.283 If the DMCA is rewritten, the European Union,
in the interest of harmonization, would probably have to follow
suit by revising the Copyright Directive. Otherwise, U.S. citizens
could be sued in another country for a use that is considered fair in
the United States, thus potentially dismantling WIPO’s ideals in
encouraging member states to agree to its treaties in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Napster II set a precedent not only for the United States, but
for the European Union as well, because the Copyright Directive is
very similar to the DMCA. Napster II thus provided a valuable
interpretation of both the DMCA and the Copyright Directive, if
the latter is even enacted in the member states.284 Legal solutions
concerning the Internet, however, become obsolete before the
courts’ opinions even reach the clerk’s office. All of the laws,
treaties, and agreements, while perhaps effective in theory, are
based on national borders and international treaties and can thus
never cover the proliferation of violations that exist in the global
and transnational reality of the Internet.285 There will always be at
least one country that will neither accept nor enforce whatever

283

For example, Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA) and Rep. John Doolittle (R-CA)
reintroduced the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act. See Digital Media Consumers’
Rights Act, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill eliminates liability for creating or
using anti-circumvention technologies if the subsequent use of the obtained copyrighted
work is either not infringement or has substantial noninfringing uses. See id. Liability
would also be eliminated when anti-circumvention involves scientific research. See id.
284
See Bergen, supra note 149, at 270.
285
See Scully, supra note 151, at 320.
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legal solutions most of the world deems proper.286 Therefore,
communities of file-sharing will probably always exist, although
there are disagreements as to how large and numerous they will be.
Despite this fact, time may prove that downloading may not be
such a rampant problem at all; the effects of peer-to-peer services
should be fully evaluated before technological development and
the public’s rights are legislated into oblivion. While “effect on
the market”287 has been an oft-stated reason for shutting down
services that allow users to download copyrighted material from
the Internet, recent research suggests that the cited effects might be
weapons in defendants’ hands. For example, a Forrester Research
study found that “piracy is not responsible for the 15 percent drop
in music sales in the past two years” and “labels can restore
industry growth by making it easier for people to find, copy, and
pay for music on their own terms. By 2007, digital music revenues
will reach more than $2 billion.”288 The New York Times reported
that “people who use file-sharing networks to obtain music at no
charge over the Internet are more likely to have increased their
spending on music than are average online music fans.”289 These
studies show strong financial and public benefits are to be gained
from the very thing that the DMCA and Copyright Directive are
trying to stamp out.
Perhaps the most likely scenario is that while the courts,
legislatures, and copyright holders are trying to find a solution, the
market will work it out. When music industry profits declined
twenty years ago, record labels launched a “home taping is killing
music” campaign.290 In 1942, after the introduction of phonograph
records, the American Federation of Musicians claimed that
musicians who performed for the records were “playing for their
own funerals.”291 Somehow, however, the music industry evolved
286

See id.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
288
See Press Release, Forrester Research, Downloads Did Not Cause the Music Slump,
But They Can Cure It (Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.forrester.com/ER/Press/
Release/0,1769,741,00.html.
289
Matt Richel, Access to Free Online Music Is Seen as a Boost to Sales, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 2002, at C6.
290
See Wolk, supra note 90.
291
Id.
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instead of falling apart; some executives today even believe that
file-sharing is good for business, as it gets their product
“advertised.”292 The best and most likely outcome of the whole
Internet copyright debacle is that the entertainment industry will
adapt to efficiently give the public what it wants and is willing to
pay for—fresher material, sharper quality, better packaging, and a
desire to own a physical collection of creative works.

292

Id.

